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JUSTIN NYBERG*

The Promise of Indian Water Leasing:
An Examination of One Tribe’s
Success at Brokering Its Surplus
Water Rights
ABSTRACT
After reaching water rights settlements, a number of Native American tribes find themselves with rights to more water than their reservations or pueblo communities presently need. As climate change
exacerbates drought conditions in the western United States and demand for water increases, some tribes have leased these surplus
water rights to public and private, non-Indian, users. Theoretically,
this could be a boon for tribes, although the extent of the economic
impact of water leasing is difficult to assess without an examination
of each individual water lease. This paper attempts to illustrate the
economic impact of Indian water rights leasing anecdotally, by examining the leasing efforts of one particularly successful tribe, the
Jicarilla Apache Nation in northern New Mexico.

I. INTRODUCTION
As climate change reduces surface water availability in the West
and cities continue to grow, the need for reliable sources of water grows
more acute.1 At the same time many Native American tribes have unresolved claims to reserved water rights, which are typically senior
rights for very large amounts of water.2 As these “paper” water rights
become quantified through settlement agreements with states and the
federal government, tribes that find themselves with surplus water
rights have an opportunity to lease them to cities and other off-reservation interests, providing a stable source of revenue to these tribal governments while filling the unmet water needs of off-reservation parties.
While theoretically this could prove to be a windfall for tribes, so far
there has been little examination of the actual economic impact that
* Justin Nyberg received his J.D. from the University of New Mexico School of Law,
graduating summa cum laude in 2014, and was an editor in chief of the Natural Resources
Journal from 2013–2014. He is currently an associate at Davis, Graham & Stubbs LLP in
Denver, Colorado.
1. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, SECURE WATER
ACT SECTION 9503(C) – RECLAMATION CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER 2011 (2011), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/climate/SECURE/docs/SECUREWaterReport.pdf.
2. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 19.03[3], at 1215–16 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK].
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water rights leasing has had on tribes. This article attempts to illustrate
the economic impact of Indian water leasing anecdotally, by analyzing
the effect that water leasing has had on one tribe: the Jicarilla Apache
Nation in northern New Mexico. The Jicarilla Apache settled their reserved water rights claims in 1992, receiving a recognized right to 40,000
acre-feet of water per year from the San Juan River.3 Congress authorized
the tribe to lease the water to off-reservation users.4 Over the next 20
years, the Nation entered into a series of 10 leases, supplying water to
off-reservation parties for a range of uses, including electrical generation,
municipal supply for two cities, residential development, ski area
snowmaking, and stream inflow for an endangered fish.5 The leases generate $3.5–$4 million annually for the Nation6—a significant revenue
stream for a reservation with less than 3,500 residents.7 The Jicarilla
Apache experience provides one model for how tribes with settled water
rights can leverage them for economic gain, while supplying the needs of
quickly growing Western cities and protecting the tribe’s own long-term
interests in water.
Part I of this article outlines the unique nature of Indian water
rights and the two main processes to quantify reserved water rights: ad-

3. Jicarilla Apache Tribal Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-441, § 6(a), 106
Stat. 2237 (1992).
4. Id. § 7(a) (“When water made available under the Settlement Contract approved by
section 5 of this Act is not being used by the Tribe, the Tribe may subcontract with third
parties, subject to the approval of the Secretary in accordance with this section, to supply
water for beneficial use outside of the reservation . . . .”).
5. See Figure 1. These include WATER SUPPLY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE JICARILLA
APACHE TRIBE AND PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW MEXICO (2000) (on file with author);
WATER SUPPLY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF SANTA FE AND THE JICARILLA APACHE NATION (2004) [hereinafter AGREEMENT BETWEEN SANTA FE AND NATION] (on file with author);
WATER SUPPLY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE JICARILLA APACHE NATION AND SAN JUAN BASIN
WATERHAULERS THE ASSOCIATION (2006) (on file with author); WATER SUPPLY AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE JICARILLA APACHE NATION AND SAN JUAN REFINING COMPANY (2006) (on file
with author); WATER SUPPLY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE JICARILLA APACHE NATION AND THE
ELKS LODGE NO. 1747 (2006) (on file with author); WATER SUPPLY AGREEMENT (2007) (on file
with author); WATER SUPPLY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF GALLUP AND THE JICARILLA
APACHE NATION (2011) [hereinafter AGREEMENT BETWEEN GALLUP AND NATION] (on file with
author); CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION AND JICARILLA APACHE NATION TO LEASE THE USE OF SAN JUANCHAMA PROJECT WATER (2012) [hereinafter CONTRACT BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND NATION]
(on file with author), WATER SUPPLY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE JICARILLA APACHE NATION
AND THE CLUB AT LAS CAMPANAS, INC. (2013) [hereinafter AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATION AND
CLUB] (on file with author); and WATER SUPPLY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE JICARILLA APACHE
NATION AND SIPAPU RECREATIONAL DEVELOPMENT II, LLC (2013) (on file with author).
6. Telephone Interview with Herb Becker, Attorney, Jicarilla Nation (Mar. 7, 2013).
7. See TILLER’S GUIDE TO INDIAN COUNTRY: ECONOMIC PROFILES OF AMERICAN INDIAN
RESERVATIONS 727 (Veronica E. Velarde Tiller, ed., 2005) [hereinafter TILLER’S GUIDE]
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judication and settlement. Part II outlines the concept of tribal marketing,
the restrictions on it, and the conceptual extent of the economic opportunities for tribes that choose to lease their water rights. Within this context, Part III analyzes the Jicarilla Apache Nation’s experience leasing
water, the financial impact the leases have had on the tribe, and the manner in which the terms of the tribe’s leases protect the tribe’s long-term
interests in its water rights.
II. BACKGROUND ON INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
Generally, water rights are transferable and marketable.8 Outside
of the context of tribal water rights, a water rights holder can freely sell
the rights or lease them to another party for a given period of time, retaining a right of reversion when the lease ends.9 Such water transfers
have generally been seen as positive in western states because they allow
for the best and highest use of the water—transferring a limited resource
from areas of excess supply to areas of high demand at prices regulated
by the market.10
Indian water rights are different, largely because they arise in a
different manner from common law and statutory water rights under
prior appropriation. Indian water rights arise through Congressional reservation,11 rather than by the “first in time, first in right” and demonstrated use principals of prior appropriation. For tribes on reservation
lands, Winters v. U.S. held that even though Congress did not explicitly
set aside water rights when it created most reservations, it did so implicitly.12 The Court reasoned that since Congress intended for the tribes to
have a settled agrarian society, Congress must have also intended to provide them with sufficient water rights to accomplish that purpose.13
These largely theoretical water rights are known as reserved rights or
Winters rights. While Winters established that tribes have reserved water
rights according to the designated purpose of tribal reservations, Arizona
v. California provided the basis for quantifying them.14 The Court held
that Congress implicitly set aside enough water to farm all “practicably

8. See A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW
PUBLIC POLICY 230 (6th ed. 2009) (excerpting Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Transferring
Water Uses in the West, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 119 (1990)).
9. See id.
10. See id. at 232.
11. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1908).
12. See id.; COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.03[4], at 1217.
13. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.03[4], at 1217.
14. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600–601 (1963), disavowed on different grounds by
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
AND
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irrigable acreage” on the reservations.15 For tribes with a great deal of
theoretically irrigable acreage, the Arizona holding implicated a staggering amount of water. The Navajo Nation, for example, was thought to
have a right to between two million16 and 15 million acre-feet of water,
which equals about the entire flow of the Colorado River.17 And because
the priority dates of these reserved rights were based on the date Congress created each reservation, these Indian water rights were often senior to all other users in the system.18 The Court’s recognition of Indian
reserved water rights consequently threatened powerful, entrenched
non-Indian water interests in Western states, which meant these interests
were poised to resist Indian attempts to quantify and exercise their water
rights.
Indian reserved water rights come with a major restriction that
does not apply to prior appropriation water rights obtained under state
law: they cannot be leased to off-reservation users without Congressional approval. The Nonintercourse Act prohibits the “purchase, grant,
lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto from
any Indian nation or tribe,” effectively prohibiting tribes from selling tribal land.19 While referring only to “lands,” this prohibition probably includes the sale or leasing of water rights.20 Most scholars qualify this
statement because another statute may allow tribes to lease their water
rights21 and the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue directly. No
federal statute explicitly authorizes tribes to lease tribal water rights
apart from the sale or lease of the appurtenant land,22 but the Court has
suggested that tribes can lease their rights to others with Congressional
authorization23 and Congress frequently authorizes off-reservation leasing for individual tribes when those tribes settle their water rights
claims.24
Ancient Native American pueblo water rights have a different origin than other Indian water rights, but pueblo rights remain largely in
the same state of limbo as reserved rights. Those pueblo lands set aside

15. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.03[5][b], at 1221.
16. William Douglas Back & Jeffrey S. Taylor, Navajo Water Rights: Pulling the Plug on
the Colorado River?, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 71, 74 (1980).
17. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 8, at 869.
18. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.03[3], 1215–16.
19. Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012).
20. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.03[7][c], at 1229.
21. See id. (“To the extent that water rights are ‘lands’ . . . they may be covered as well
by 25 U.S.C. § 415, which authorizes the leasing of tribal ‘lands’ for certain purposes.”).
22. Id.
23. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 9:43 (2014).
24. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, §19.03[7][c], at 1229–30.
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by Congress or executive order have Winters rights like any other tribal
reservation land,25 which are quantified by the “practicably irrigable
acreage” standard.26 However, some pueblos trace parcels of their land
back to Spanish land grants honored under the 1848 Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo when the U.S. acquired the New Mexico Territory.27
On these lands, the pueblos hold “aboriginal water rights,”28 which
courts quantify based on the amount of water the pueblos used for irrigation and domestic use prior to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and
the water necessary to irrigate pueblo lands between 1846 and 1924.29
Aboriginal rights are senior to the rights of any other non-Indian user in
the system.30 However, few pueblos know how much water they have a
right to use or lease because, with the exception of the four Aamodt Pueblos and the pueblo of Taos, they have not sought adjudication of their
water rights claims.31 Lacking a firm quantification of their rights effectively limits these pueblos’ ability to market their surplus water.
A. Adjudication and Settlement of Indian Water Rights
While Winters, Arizona, and the aboriginal rights doctrine provide
conceptual frameworks for quantifying tribal water rights, the actual
quantification should theoretically occur through general stream adjudication. A general stream adjudication is a court proceeding that allows
all water users in a particular water system to contest the rights of all
other users, leading ultimately to a final judicial determination of all parties’ rights, including Indian claims.32 These adjudications usually entail
a parade of experts who testify about the extent of a tribe’s practicably
irrigable acreage or historical evidence of irrigation.33 Few tribes wish to
litigate these complex claims due to the time, expense, and uncertainty
25. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 4.07[2][c], at 322; ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 713 (2d ed. 2010) (citing New Mexico ex
rel. Martinez v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993, 1010 (D.N.M. 1985).
26. See discussion infra Part II.A.
27. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 434 (5th ed. 2009).
28. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 4.07[2][c], at 322; ANDERSON ET AL., supra note
25, at 713 (citing COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 331–34 (2005)).
29. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 4.07[2][c], at 323.
30. See id. § 19.03[3], at 1215–16.
31. Telephone Interview with Herb Becker, Attorney, Jicarilla Nation (May 15, 2013).
32. See Reid Peyton Chambers & John E. Echohawk, Implementing the Winters Doctrine
of Indian Reserved Water Rights: Producing Indian Water and Economic Development Without
Injuring Non-Indian Water Users?, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 447, 455–56 (1991).
33. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.03[5][b], at 1222 (“To show that
land is practicably irrigable, a tribe must demonstrate that the land is capable of sustained
irrigation based on arability and engineering feasibility, and that it is capable of irrigation
at a reasonable cost.”).
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that the process entails.34 Adjudications are notoriously long and costly,
often conducted in state court, and often adverse to tribal interests.35 Additionally, recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have been seen as
hostile to both tribal sovereignty36 and the practicably irrigable acreage
standard,37 further eroding tribes’ incentive to adjudicate. Even if tribes
complete the adjudication process, they may not have the capital necessary to realize any benefit from their newly quantified rights given the
immense costs to build water delivery and storage infrastructure and the
historic reluctance of the federal government to provide financial assistance.38 Generally, tribes now see adjudication as a futile39 option for converting their theoretical “paper” water rights into usable “wet” water
rights.
Given the challenges with adjudication, the trend has shifted toward negotiated settlements of Indian water rights claims.40 In these settlements, tribes, states, and federal agencies reach deals, converting the
tribes’ large but unquantified water rights into concrete rights that tribes
can actually use.41 Like adjudications, these negotiations are long and
costly, but they entail less risk for tribes, greater flexibility to accommodate the economic interests of all parties, and greater certainty in the
outcome.42 The settlements quantify the tribe’s rights and often allocate
water from existing sources, such as dams or federal projects, and appropriate federal funds to pay for new delivery systems to tribal communities.43 In exchange, tribes agree to waive the balance of their large,
outstanding Winters rights and often settle other legal claims as well.44

34. See David H. Getches, Management and Marketing of Indian Water: From Conflict to
Pragmatism, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 515, 521–23 (1988).
35. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.05[2], at 1247.
36. TARLOCK, supra note 23, at § 9:45.
37. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.03[5][b], at 1223; Karen Crass, Eroding
the Winters Right: Non-Indian Water User’s Attempt To Limit the Scope of the Indian Superior
Entitlement To Western Water To Prevent Tribes from Water Brokering, 1 U. DENV. WATER L.
REV. 109, 116 (1997).
38. See id. at 119.
39. See Jesse Harlan Alderman, Winters and Water Conservation: A Proposal To Halt
“Water Laundering” in Tribal Negotiated Settlements in Favor of Monetary Compensation, 31 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 39 (2013).
40. See Getches, supra note 34, at 523.
41. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 25, at 774.
42. Getches, supra note 34, at 523–24.
43. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 25, at 774.
44. See, e.g., CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE
§ 2(a)(i)–(ii), at 3 (1992) [hereinafter CONTRACT], available at http://www.ose.state.nm.us/
LAP/NNWRS/Responses/Jicarilla%20Settlement%20Contract%201992-12-08.pdf (demonstrating agreement by the Jicarilla to drop several legal claims against the United States).
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Settlements do come with disadvantages for tribes. Tribes invariably receive far less water than they would have been entitled to under
the “practicably irrigable acreage” standard,45 and tribes that have not
adjudicated the extent of their water rights may have a weaker bargaining position.46 Still, settlements have become the primary mechanism for
tribes to establish their water rights. Tribes reached at least 28 settlements between 1988 and 2013, with another one—the Aamodt settlement
between several northern New Mexico pueblos—currently in its final
stages.47 As of 2009, there were at least 18 pending water rights settlements in the works, involving approximately 25 tribes or pueblos.48
III. MARKETING TRIBAL WATER
Water marketing “is the sale or lease of water or water rights, independent of the appurtenant land.”49 There are regional economic benefits to marketing water rights because it allows water to shift from lower
value uses to higher value uses.50 Allowing water rights holders to sell or
lease their rights is cheaper, more politically practicable, and more environmentally acceptable than developing new water supplies or storage
facilities.51 As demographics shift in the West, water markets allow economic forces to drive the West’s future.
Both Indians and non-Indians stand to benefit from water marketing. Water marketing allows tribes to profit from the full extent of their
water rights reasonably quickly without requiring the tribe to invest in
water delivery infrastructure otherwise needed to make use of their
water.52 Given the cost and delays inherent in building such infrastructure, the consensus seems to be that leasing water rights is the most feasible way for tribes to receive a swift economic return on their water
45. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.05[2], at 1256 (“Virtually all tribes agree
to a lesser quantity of water than they would claim in litigation.”).
46. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.05[2], at 1256.
47. For a partial list, see TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 8, at 925–27 (listing distinct settlements between 1978–2009). Since then, the Taos Pueblo in New Mexico reached a settlement, and the Aamodt settlement, involving four New Mexico pueblos, entered its final
stages. For an updated list of all settlements, see NAWRS, UNM LOBOVAULT, http://reposi
tory.unm.edu/handle/1928/21727 (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
48. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.05[2], at 1257 (citing Robert T. Anderson,
Indian Water Rights, Practical Reasoning, and Negotiated Settlements, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1133,
1154 (2010)).
49. JUDITH V. ROYSTER & MICHAEL C. BLUMM, NATIVE AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 452 (2d ed. 2008).
50. BONNIE G. COLBY ET AL., NEGOTIATING TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS: FULFILLING PROMISES
IN THE ARID WEST 83 (2005).
51. Id.
52. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.03[7][c], at 1228.
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entitlement.53 There are distinct advantages for non-tribal interests as
well.54 Tribal water marketing allows non-Indians to access secure, stable
water supplies for off-reservation economic development,55 which makes
settlements more attractive to all parties.56 For example, cities facing a
disruption of their water supply can pose enormous political obstacles
for Indian settlements, but the prospect of the city leasing newly-settled
tribal water rights aligns the interests of both tribes and cities.57
However, tribal water leasing has drawn some criticism.58 Some
argue that allowing tribes to lease water off-reservation is inconsistent
with the foundational concept of Winters rights: namely that Winters
rights are appurtenant to the reservation59 and envisioned and quantified
for agricultural use,60 not general economic development.61 During the
heat of the debate in the 1980s and 1990s,62 Professor David Getches argued that this criticism was inconsistent with the Court’s ruling in Arizona v. California, which held that tribes could use their quantified water
rights for any beneficial purpose, even if those rights were originally envisioned to serve agricultural needs.63 Tribes were originally given reserved water rights for irrigation not merely so tribes could farm,
Getches argued, but also so tribes could have a sustainable economic

53. See id. (citing Lee Herold Storey, Comment, Leasing Indian Water Off the Reservation:
A Use Consistent with the Reservation’s Purpose, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 217 (1988)); Crass, supra
note 37, at 121 n.70; see also Getches, supra note 34, at 544 (“In some cases a tribe may be
more satisfied and ‘successful’ selling water to a downstream municipality or industry
than it would be in making heroic efforts to develop marginal agriculture or to assemble
enough capital to attract industries within the reservation boundaries that could use the
water and at the same time return an income to the tribe.”).
54. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.03[7][c], at 1228; Crass, supra note 37, at
120–21.
55. See Crass, supra note 37, at 120–21; BONNIE G. COLBY ET AL., supra note 50, at 86.
56. See BONNIE G. COLBY ET AL., supra note 50, at 86.
57. See id. at 47–48 (demonstrating statements of a deputy city manager in Phoenix on
the 99-year and 100-year lease options, and political powers of thirsty cities—“I don’t think
that bills would get through Congress if the cities did not support them”); Alderman, supra
note 39, at 39 (“Non-Indian politicians and appropriators often become the most vociferous
supporters of negotiated settlements when they piggyback on new diversion projects authorized by the agreements, or at least gain a new source of wet water from tribal
marketing.”).
58. For a good summary of the arguments against Indian water markets, see MARC
REISNER & SARAH BATES, OVERTAPPED OASIS: REFORM OR REVOLUTION FOR WESTERN WATER
95–98 (1990).
59. TARLOCK, supra note 23, at § 9:43 (“Opponents of transfer argue that the logic of
Winters requires the reserved rights be appurtenant to the reservation.”).
60. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.03[7][c], at 1229.
61. See Getches, supra note 34, at 542.
62. See REISNER & BATES, supra note 58, at 91.
63. Getches, supra note 34, 543 (citing Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419, 422 (1979)).
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base.64 This goal is served just as well by allowing tribes to lease water to
off-reservation users.65 Furthermore, Congress’s intent at the time it created the reservations becomes irrelevant when Congress expressly authorizes tribal water rights leasing in settlements today. As Getches put
it, “if Congress approves specific transactions[,] any issue of its intent
becomes moot.”66
Many early critics of tribal water leasing feared that such leasing
would upset the status quo, reducing the amount of water available to
other water rights holders, raising the price of water,67 or disrupting previously “settled” interstate allocations.68 Leasing tribal water rights certainly comes at the disadvantage of those off-reservation users who
previously used the water unconstrained by theoretical senior tribal
rights.69 Where such interested parties have political influence, they may
continue to pose an obstacle for tribes to freely market their water.
Some environmentalists further argue that leasing tribal water
rights will disadvantage lower economic value uses that have important
social or environmental impacts such as local agriculture or in-stream
flows.70 Instead, critics claim, tribes will sell the water to the highest bidders—such as large cities and developers—thereby encouraging reckless
urban growth.71 This argument simply critiques the larger market-based
approach to water rights transfers that has long been accepted in the
West and is not unique to Indian water rights transfers. Others have criticized water marketing as “yet another device for parting Indians from
their resources.”72 However, this argument ignores the fact that Indian
water leases are voluntary and market driven, can be crafted for short
terms, and can be structured with “opt-out” clauses whereby either party
can terminate the contract if necessary.73 Water leases are fundamentally
unlike leases for extractive industries, such as mining, or the alienation
of tribal lands to non-members. Surface water is renewable on infinite
annual cycles. Thus, when tribes exercise their reversionary interest in
64. See id. at 543.
65. See Storey, supra note 53, at 183–84.
66. Getches, supra note 34, at 543.
67. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.03[7][c], at 1229.
68. Crass, supra note 37, at 124.
69. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.03[7][c], at 1228–29 (citing David H.
Getches, Management and Marketing of Indian Water: From Conflict to Pragmatism, 58 U COLO.
L. REV. 515, 545 (1988)).
70. Alderman, supra note 39, at 40.
71. See id. at 41 (“Most of the wet water from these settlements is, or will be, sold to
advance reckless urban growth, expand heavily polluting industries, or enable more wasteful irrigation.”).
72. Getches, supra note 34, at 542.
73. See, e.g., WATER SUPPLY AGREEMENT, supra note 5, at 20.
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the water right, they return to the same position from which they started
but with interim economic gain. As long as the lease is not unreasonably
long, tribes simply get paid to not use water that they would not or
could not use anyway.
For these reasons, most scholars and policymakers seem to agree
that allowing tribes to lease surplus water is good policy.74 The federal
government, and U.S. Department of the Interior specifically, support tribal water leasing to promote a more efficient use of the West’s water.75
Several national commissions recommend allowing Indians to lease
water off-reservation on fully appropriated streams as a matter of
fairness.76
A. Authorization and restrictions on leasing
There are two main obstacles for tribes to lease their surplus
water: quantification and authorization. First, a tribe’s water rights must
be quantified and firmly settled because lessees do not want to lease
rights that might later be challenged by a third party. Secondly, Congress
must grant a tribe authority to lease the rights.77 There is not a general
federal law that authorizes tribes to sell or lease their water rights without selling or leasing the land to which the water rights are appurtenant.78 Scholars have called for Congress to lift this restriction entirely,
just as Congress has done for almost every other natural resource.79
As it is, Congress grants authorization in a piecemeal fashion as
individual tribes settle their claims. When it approves tribal water rights
settlements, Congress almost always authorizes the particular tribe to

74. Most of the criticism I could find dates from the early 1980s. See, e.g., Jack D. Palma
II, Considerations and Conclusions Concerning the Transferability of Indian Water Rights, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 91, 94–96 (1980); Belinda K. Orem, Paleface, Redskin, and the Great White Chiefs
in Washington: Drawing the Battle Lines Over Western Water Rights, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 449,
468–69 (1980). See also Jesse Harlan Alderman, supra note 39, at 40.
75. Crass, supra note 37, 121.
76. See, e.g., NAT’L WATER COMM’N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION 481 (1973), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CZIC-hd1694-a57-1973/
html/CZIC-hd1694-a57-1973.htm (Recommendation No. 14-5); W. WATER POLICY REVIEW
ADVISORY COMM’N, WATER IN THE WEST: CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, at 3-46, 3-47
(1998). The one question, on which there remains substantial disagreement, is whether
tribes should be allowed to lease water out of state. See Chris Seldin, Comment, Interstate
Marketing of Indian Water Rights: The Impact of the Commerce Clause, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1545,
1545–47 (1999).
77. See Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012).
78. Judith V. Royster, Indian Water and the Federal Trust: Some Proposals for Federal
Action, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 375, 396 (2006).
79. See id. at 396–97.
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market its water to off-reservation users,80 often with a requirement that
the Secretary of Interior approve each individual lease. Only in two cases
have the terms of the settlement prevented the tribes from leasing or
marketing their water—the 1987 and 1988 settlements of the Seminole
Tribe and the Mission Bands of California.81 Other settlements have allowed tribal water marketing through means other than explicit Congressional authorization. Two settlements declared that the
Nonintercourse Act does not apply to the particular water at issue in
those cases. This, in effect, freed those tribes to lease their rights without
approval by the Secretary.82 In at least one case, Congress required the
tribe to submit a water code for Secretarial approval, after which it was
free to market its water without further authorizations. Regardless of the
form, today it is standard for tribal water rights settlements to come with
some sort of Congressional authorization for tribes to market their water.
However, settlements often restrict the ways in which tribes can
lease their water.83 Many settlements expressly prohibit tribes from selling rights outright, limit the length of water leases to 100 years or less,84
require the Secretary of Interior to approve each individual lease,85 or
prevent the tribes from leasing the water out of state.86 There are many
other types of restrictions,87 all dependent on the unique circumstances
surrounding each tribe’s negotiations. Most of these limitations are concessions to secure the approval of state and congressional partners, yet
these long-term restrictions reduce the economic opportunities tribes can
receive from their leases. Professor Daniel McCool has said that when
tribes look back years from now, “they’ll say, ‘The albatross around our
neck is the inability to freely market water to whomever we want, whenever we want.’”88

80. See id. at 395; see also TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 8, at 925–27 (listing distinct settlements between 1978 and 2009).
81. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 8, at 925.
82. Royster, supra note 78, at 396–97.
83. See TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 8, at 924.
84. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.05[2], at 1252–53 .
85. See id. § 19.05[2], at 1253.
86. Id. at 1252 n.70. The 2009 settlement with the Navajo Nation, for example, allows
the tribe to lease water off-reservation, but only to users within New Mexico. Omnibus
Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, § 10701(d)(1)(A), 123 Stat. 991,
1399.
87. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 19.05[2], at 1252–54.
88. Daniel Kraker, The New Water Czars, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Mar. 15, 2004, http://
www.hcn.org/issues/270/14616.
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B. Extent of Economic Opportunity for Tribes
The potential economic impact from leasing water rights differs
for each tribe. First, before a tribe can evaluate its potential economic
gain from leasing water rights, the tribe must settle its water rights so it
can determine the quantity of its surplus water. Second, a tribe must find
a market for its water. The price per acre-foot can vary wildly, depending on the regional demand and the structure of the individual lease.
Among the factors that affect the market price of water rights are security and flexibility.89 Variables also include user demand and competition,
social valuations of water, imperfections in the market system, other externalities and impacts on a third-party user, and the method of appraisal90—such as whether the price of the water is set by market rate,
replacement value, or derivative value.91
What seems beyond dispute is that the price of water only stands
to go up as climate change decreases the surface water available in the
West, groundwater use increases, and populations continue to grow. For
example, between 2010 and 2039, the water storage in the Colorado River
Basin is expected to drop 36 percent from pre-1995 levels, snowpack will
drop by 24 percent, and runoff will drop by 14 percent.92 This ought to
serve as an incentive for tribes to settle their rights sooner rather than
later, since increased demand will likely only increase state resistance to
tribal claims to reserved water rights93 and increase the negotiating
power of those tribes who have already settled their rights.
Because the economic potential of tribal water leasing is so case
specific, the best way to evaluate it is to examine how individual tribes
have benefited from leasing. The Ak-Chin community in Arizona was
the first tribe to settle its water rights in 1978,94 leasing 10,000 acre-feet
annually to the developer of Anthem, a planned community north of
Phoenix, for 100 years at $1,200 an acre-foot. In the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community settlement of 1988, Congress authorized that
community to lease 13,300 acre-feet per year to residential cities in the
Phoenix area for 99 years in exchange for a lump-sum payment of $16

89. BONNIE COLBY SALIBA & DAVID B. BUSH, WATER MARKETS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE:
MARKET TRANSFERS, WATER VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 48 (1987).
90. See id. at 187–233 (providing a chapter on “Valuing Water Rights for Public and
Private Decision Making”).
91. See COLBY ET AL., supra note 50, at 48.
92. STEPHEN SAUNDERS & MAUREEN MAXWELL, LESS SNOW, LESS WATER: CLIMATE DISRUPTION IN THE WEST 17 (2005), available at http://rockymountainclimate.org/website%20
pictures/Less%20Snow%20Less%20Water.pdf.
93. See discussion infra Part IV.
94. COLBY ET AL., supra note 50, at 115.
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million.95 Under the Gila River Indian Community’s proposed settlement
in 2004, the Community would acquire the right to lease 41,000 acre-feet
of water to off reservation parties, with an option to lease up to 100,000
acre-feet in the future.96 At the time, the water manager of Phoenix, Arizona, Tom Buschatzke, said that the city planned to lease 15,000 acre-feet
for around $1,500 per acre-foot, which would net the tribe $22.5 million
per year.97 However, the terms of most other tribal water leases remain
unpublished, rendering it difficult to asses the overall economic impact
water leasing has had for tribes without a comprehensive case-by-case
analysis.
To provide a snapshot of what such a comprehensive, case-bycase analysis would reveal, the remainder of this article examines all of
the water leases one tribe has made since settling its water claims. It focuses on the Jicarilla Apache Nation in New Mexico because the tribe has
developed a long and successful record of leasing to a variety of offreservation users.
IV. THE JICARILLA EXAMPLE
The Jicarilla Apache Nation encompasses a little less than 1,400
square miles (879,917 acres) of northern New Mexico, an area just larger
than the state of Rhode Island. It was created and then expanded by a
series of three Executive Orders in 1887, 1907, and 1908,98 encompassing
a mountainous area over 10,000 feet in elevation.99 In 2009, the Nation
had a population of 3,127,100 with a tribal member per capita income of
$14,332, and median household income of $42,772.101 Mining is the greatest source of revenue for the tribe,102 and since at least 1982, 69 percent of
the reservation land was leased to mineral interests.103 More than half of
the 802 tribal members work for the government.104

95. REISNER & BATES, supra notes 58, at 95–96; COLBY ET AL., supra note 50, at 136.
96. Kraker, supra note 88.
97. Id.
98. TILLER’S GUIDE, supra note 7, at 727.
99. Id.
100. ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates: 2005–2009, AMERICAN FACTFINDER
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=
ACS_09_5YR_DP5YR5&prodType=table (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
101. Selected Economic Characteristics: 2005–2009, AMERICAN FACTFINDER http://fact
finder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_09_5YR_
DP5YR3&prodType=table (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
102. TILLER’S GUIDE, supra note 7, at 729.
103. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 135 (1982) (noting that the tribe had
executed mineral leases encompassing 69 percent of the reservation land).
104. TILLER’S GUIDE supra note 7, at 727–28.
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The Nation finalized its water rights settlement in 1992, becoming
the first tribe in New Mexico to do so.105 Under this settlement, the Nation received a right to deplete up to 25,500 acre-feet per year from the
Navajo Reservoir or Navajo River supply, and 6,500 acre-feet from the
San Juan-Chama Project supply.106 The settlement also allowed the Nation to lease its surplus water to off-reservation parties, subject to approval by the Secretary of Interior, and subject to federal and state law,
interstate compacts, and international law.107 The Secretary of Interior is
required to approve the leases so long as certain conditions are met—for
example, the lease must comply with the National Environmental Policy
Act, cannot exceed 99 years, and the Secretary must determine the lease
is in the tribe’s best interests.108
The Jicarilla Apache Nation is exceptionally well suited to serve as
a water rights broker because the reservation has access to water in two
watersheds, on either side of the Continental Divide.109 The Nation sits
on the eastern side of the San Juan River basin,110 which drains into the
Colorado River and the state of Arizona. In addition, the Nation purchased three off reservation ranches in the 1970s, giving the tribe direct
access to the Rio Chama,111 which flows into the Rio Grande and Willow
Creek. The Rio Grande and Willow Creek in turn convey San JuanChama Diversion water to a storage facility at Heron Reservoir.112 The
Nation can consequently serve two distinct water markets along the Colorado River and Rio Grande, whereas most tribes can serve only one.
Since settling its water rights in 1992, the Nation has entered into
10 leases with off-reservation parties.113 The first and largest of the leases
was a 21-year lease of 16,500 acre-feet to the Public Service Company of
New Mexico for the utility’s coal-fired San Juan Generating Station. The

105. Id. at 727.
106. Jicarilla Apache Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-441, § 6(a), 106
Stat. 2237 (1992); CONTRACT, supra note 44, § 4(d), at 5.
107. CONTRACT, supra note 44, § 11(a), at 10.
108. Id. § 11(d)(ii)–(iii), (vi), at 11.
109. The Continental Divide runs through the Jicarilla Apache reservation. See U.S.
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE OF THE JICARILLA APACHE INDIAN RESERVATION NEW MEXICO APPROVED AUGUST 4, 1937, at 2 (1937), available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/american-in
dian-consts/PDF/37028947.pdf.
110. TILLER’S GUIDE, supra note 7, at 727.
111. Id.
112. For a map of the San Juan-Chama Diversion Project, see San Juan Chama Project,
BUCKMAN DIRECT DIVERSION, http://bddproject.org/history/san-juan-chama-project/ (last
visited May 14, 2013).
113. See Figure 1 at the end of this document (providing the general elements of each of
the ten leases).
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smallest lease was for municipal supply for a single Elks Lodge in Farmington, New Mexico. The lodge—which has a restaurant, lounge, mini
casino, and 1,450 members114—received rights to 15-acre-feet per year at
$90 per acre-foot. In addition to these two leases, most of the Nation’s
off-reservation water went toward industrial uses related to power generation and coal mining. The Nation also made two contracts for municipal supply to cities—one in 2004 to supply the city of Santa Fe, New
Mexico with 3,000 acre-feet a year for 52 years, and one in 2011 to supply
Gallup, New Mexico with 7,500 acre-feet for 40 years. These were the
first instances of a tribe leasing water to cities in New Mexico.115
The Nation has also supplied water to a private developer,116 a
private ski area,117 and even the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, which purchased the right to release up to 5,300 acre-feet to use as in-stream flow
to protect the endangered silvery minnow in 2013, a year of markedly
low water levels.118 While most of the customers for the Nation’s water
are within 100–200 miles of the reservation, the tribe is making overtures
to potential customers as far away as El Paso, Texas, some 430 miles
downstream.119 The tribe expects the demand along the middle Rio
Grande to continue to grow.120
As of 2013, the tribe was actively leasing 32,000 of its 40,000 acrefeet of water121 at prices between $81 and $110 per acre-foot. According
to Herb Becker, attorney for the Jicarilla Apache Nation, the leases generate $3.5–$4 million per year for the tribe.122 It is hard to say how signifi-

114. See generally Lodge #1747 Home, ELKS USA, http://www.elks.org/lodges/home
.cfm?LodgeNumber=1747 (last visited Oct. 22, 2014).
115. See Elizabeth Hartwell Richards, Over-Allocation and the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation: Water Rights Settlement Agreements in New Mexico, at 39 (Sept. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Standford University), available at http://books.google.com/
books?id=KWauJgOBaIEC&pg=PA39&lpg=PA39&dq=jicarilla+water+lease&source=bl&
ots=Lhgbd-XDJc&sig=sdk_sVQ3ORP5d_XvPhVC-DtRIgQ&hl=en&sa=X& ei=CRQ1UaD_
AYWzygHVkoDIAQ&ved=0CDgQ6AEwADgK#v=onepage&q=jicarilla%20water%20lease
&f=false.
116. The lease provided water to Las Campanas, which developed luxury homes and a
golf course on the outskirts of Santa Fe, New Mexico. See AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATION AND
CLUB, supra note 5, at 1. See generally THE CLUB AT LAS CAMPANAS, http://www.theclubatlas
campanas.com/Club/Scripts/Home/home.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
117. New Mexico’s Sipapu ski area leased the water to make snow. A Proposed Water
Transfer from the Jicarilla Apaches to Sipapu Ski Area: “Real” or Paper Water? LA JICARITA, Nov.
1, 2012, http://lajicarita.wordpress.com/2012/11/01/a-proposed-water-transfer-from-thejicarilla-apaches-to-sipapu-ski-area-real-or-paper-water/.
118. CONTRACT BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND NATION, supra note 5, at 1–2.
119. Telephone Interview with Herb Becker, supra note 6.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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cant an amount of revenue this is for the tribe, since the Nation would
not disclose its general operating budget. “It’s a sizeable chunk of
money, but I don’t think it’s a sizeable percentage of the government’s
budget. But it can pay for considerable activities that the tribe has,”
Becker said.123 The revenue goes into the Nation’s general fund to pay for
police, senior services, and other municipal programs.124
The water leases appear to have no downside for the tribe. The
Nation itself has limited water needs. The current water usage for onreservation demands is about 4,200 acre-feet per year,125 none of which is
supplied with the water rights obtained through the 1992 settlement.126
The Nation’s current needs are all met with a set of adjudicated water
rights that the tribe previously obtained, and the tribe has no foreseeable
on-reservation use for the 40,000 acre-feet it obtained through the 1992
settlement. Agriculture is not a major part of the Nation’s economy.
While the reservation has about 58,000 acres of irrigable land, only about
1,000 acres is actually irrigated, with another 6,496 acres put to non-irrigated use.127 Only 17 people were employed in agriculture in 2005.128 In
1990, the tribe’s crops were worth a mere $365,000.129 If the Nation were
unable to lease the water it received through the settlement, it would
simply flow past the reservation each year without benefitting the tribe
at all.130
The settlement water does come with some costs. The Nation
must pay a portion of the operation, maintenance, and replacement costs
of the Heron and Navajo reservoirs each year. For example, between
1992 and 2012, the tribe paid $2.60 per acre-foot for costs related to the
Navajo Reservoir, and the Nation owes $29.40 per acre-foot for water
stored in the San Juan Chama Project through 2021.131 However, the Nation often passes these costs on to the leasing parties.132

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Telephone Interview with Herb Becker, supra note 31.
126. Telephone Interview with Herb Becker, supra note 6.
127. See TILLER’S GUIDE, supra note 7, at 730.
128. Selected Economic Characteristics: 2005–2009, AMERICAN FACTFINDER, http://factfind
er2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_09_5YR_DP5
YR3&prodType=table (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
129. TILLER’S GUIDE, supra note 7, at 729.
130. Telephone Interview with Herb Becker, supra note 6.
131. CONTRACT, supra note 44, § 10(a)(ii), (b)(i), at 8–9.
132. For example, PNM’s 2000 contract with the Nation included a clause that PNM
will pay a proportionate amount of the tribe’s share of the Navajo Dam and Reservoir
capital construction costs of $2.60 per acre-foot each year. This helped the tribe offset
$42,120 each year between 2006 and 2012.
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The Nation has used the terms of the leases to protect its interests
in a few ways. Most of the leases are for reasonably short periods, allowing the tribe to access its reversionary interest more quickly in the
event the water is needed on the reservation. Two leases were for a year
or less133 and five leases were for nine years. The two longest leases were
to cities—the 52-year lease to Santa Fe and 40-year lease to Gallup. These
leases are long enough that the cities may rely on the supply for their
own long-term water planning,134 but they are much shorter than the 99year and 100-year leases signed by the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian
Community and Ak-Chin communities, which are more akin to permanent alienations of the water.135
Another lease element present in many of these contracts is an
early termination clause that allows the tribe, the buyer, or both parties
to terminate the contract before its term expires, often with a pre-determined or liquidated damage amount.136 This clause came into play most
prominently in the Nation’s 2004 lease of water to Santa Fe. The Santa Fe
lease called for the tribe to supply the city with 3,000 acre-feet per year
from the Nation’s San Juan-Chama Project water for 53 years.137 The city
had a right to opt out of the contract for any reason, upon payment of a
specified liquidated damage amount and four years of payments for the
water it relinquished.138 Santa Fe exercised its right to opt out of the contract when a new city council expressed concerns about the cost of the
water.139 Generally, cities are best served by acquiring permanent water
rights—i.e., by buying them outright—so as to not risk losing them when
a water rights lease ends.140 But the Nation’s early termination clauses
protect cities from committing to a long term water supply that turns out
to be too expensive or unnecessary.141

133. See Figure 1 at the end of this article. One was to the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
for inflow protection for the endangered silvery minnow, and the other was to the Sipapu
ski area for snowmaking.
134. See Richards, supra note 115, at 39.
135. Telephone Interview with Bonnie Colby, Professor, University of Arizona (Mar. 25,
2013).
136. See, e.g., AGREEMENT BETWEEN SANTA FE AND NATION, supra note 5, 14–16. The
leases are public documents that can be retrieved by Freedom of Information Act Request
to the U.S. Department of Interior, and are on file with the author.
137. Id. at 4.
138. Id. at 14–15.
139. Telephone Interview with Herb Becker, supra note 6.
140. See Richards, supra note 115, at 41.
141. For example, the 40-year contract with Gallup does not appear to have a similar
opt out mechanism for the city. See AGREEMENT BETWEEN GALLUP AND NATION, supra note 5,
at 3, 13.
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The Nation retained a right to terminate the contract early without
any penalty in just one of its leases. In its 2007 contract with the Public
Service Company of New Mexico (PNM), Arizona Public Service Company, and BHP Navajo Coal Company to supply 8,500 acre-feet for nine
years, the Nation reserved the right to terminate the contract early.142
This apparently gives the Nation the ability to stop delivering water to
PNM without exposing itself to liability, although the tribe’s payments
will be reduced pro rata for the reduction in water delivery.143 This gives
the tribe ample flexibility to respond to changing needs on the
reservation.
The flexibility can extend in the other direction, as well. Some of
the Nation’s contracts allow buyers to reserve water through an early
“opt-in” agreement. For example, in the Nation’s 2011 lease to Gallup,
New Mexico, the city began paying $30,000 to the Nation each year for
the right to access 7,500 acre-feet per year. Actual use of the water is
scheduled to begin in 2025 once the city’s water delivery infrastructure is
ready.144 “We will be paid for 15 years before the city actually takes any
water,” Becker said.145 The Nation is free to use the water in the
meantime, and could potentially lease it out to another party, provided
the water is available for Gallup when the city is ready for it.
One difficulty in forming long-term water leases is determining a
fair price for the water over the term of the lease. It is impossible to know
how quickly the value of water will grow in a given market, and tribes
risk undervaluing their water by leasing it out for many years at a fixed
price.146 Therefore, all of the Nation’s leases that are longer than one year
have a price escalator clause, whereby the price of the water increases
over time. Most have a fixed, 8–10 percent price inflator built in, but a

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

BONNIE

WATER SUPPLY AGREEMENT, supra note 5, at 4, 21.
See id. at 7.
AGREEMENT BETWEEN GALLUP AND NATION, supra note 5, at 3, 6.
Telephone Interview with Herb Becker, supra note 6.
Compensation agreements must take into account how the value of the
water will change over time. If a discrepancy emerges over the years between the market value of water and the lease payments, the stability of
the agreement may be threatened. To overcome this problem, the lease
agreement should provide that lease payments be adjustable periodically.
The adjustment factor should reflect changes in water values over time, be
readily measurable, and not be subject to manipulation by parties to the
agreement. The adjustment factor may be based on energy costs in the
region (since energy is one of the primary costs of supplying water), on
water rates charged by regional water providers, or on a general price
index, such as the consumer price index. The adjustment factor should be
acceptable to all parties and specified in the lease agreement.
G. COLBY ET AL., supra note 50, at 86.
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few are tied directly to the market rate for water, or to a fluctuating rate
set by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. In the leases to Gallup and Santa
Fe, the price is regularly readjusted to “fair market value.” Every two
years, an independent consultant determines the increase or decrease in
the fair market value for the water in the region, and the price paid by
the city is adjusted accordingly.147 This protects the Nation from tying
itself to the price of water at the time it enters into a lease when the value
of water is expected to grow significantly in coming years due to increased demand from growth and decreased supply from climate
change.
All of the Nation’s leases contain provisions that relieve the tribe
of a responsibility to deliver water, and of the buyer’s continued obligation to pay, if there is a water shortage.148 The leases also contain a “use it
or lose it” clause, whereby the buyer loses the rights to the water if it is
not called for by the end of the year—a buyer cannot store the water in a
reservoir, or credit non-use toward future use.149 This reflects the Nation’s own inability to bank water at the Navajo and Heron reservoirs
under federal contract.150
V. CONCLUSION
The Jicarilla Apache Nation’s water rights leases serve as an example of how a tribe can leverage surplus water rights for economic gain
without unduly restricting the tribe’s ability to use the water for on-reservation uses in the future. The financial return on the Nation’s leases
may not be a windfall, but the $3.5–4 million per year the tribe currently
receives from its leases is a significant source of revenue given the tribe’s
size and the amount of water at its disposal. Revenue may also grow as
demand for the water increases in the region. Most importantly, the example of the Jicarilla Nation demonstrates that leases can be structured
in a way that is not burdensome for tribes and preserves both their longterm access to water and flexibility to respond to changing circumstances, such as spikes in water prices or a sudden need for the water on
the reservation. In the Nation’s experience, this has made water leasing a
“win-win” for both the tribe and its water customers, with no apparent
downside for the tribe. “We have no complaints,” says Becker. “The tribe

147. See AGREEMENT BETWEEN GALLUP AND NATION, supra note 5, at 7–8; AGREEMENT
BETWEEN SANTA FE AND NATION, supra note 5, at 7–8.
148. The leases are public documents that can be retrieved by Freedom of Information
Act Request to the U.S. Department of Interior, and are on file with author.
149. The leases are public documents that can be retrieved by Freedom of Information
Act Request to the U.S. Department of Interior, and are on file with author.
150. CONTRACT, supra note 44, § 4(g), at 6.
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has been happy because we have the escalator clauses in there, and we
haven’t had to cancel any of the leases—so that makes the users happy.
But if there is any aspect of any of these leases that either side is not
happy with, then we can sit down and renegotiate.”151

151. Telephone Interview with Herb Becker, supra note 6.
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$100
per AF

$1.5
million
per
year

“USBR
CRSP
Rate”

Price

n/a

$300,000 per
year “holding
rights” until
contract was
approved

$2,033,073 (nonreimbursable
reserve fee,
credited toward
usage), $42,120
for O&M*

Other
Payments

Jan. 1,
2006

Sept. 2,
2004

July 17,
2000

Date of
Contract

Jan. 1,
2006

Oct. 27,
2005

Jan. 1,
2006

Date of
First
Delivery

Dec. 31,
2015

Dec. 31,
2057

Dec. 31,
2027

End
Date

No.

Yes. City may
terminate
early with
four years
notice. Tribe
may not.

Yes for PNM,
if generating
station ceases
operation. Not
for tribe.

Early
Termination

Yes. 8%
increase
each year.

Yes.
Indexed
to CPI
and
increase in
FMV
every 2
years.

Yes.
Limited to
+/- 10%
per year.

Water
Price
Escalator
Clause

Fall 2014

unknown
Seq: 21
22-JAN-15
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152. The leases are public documents that can be retrieved by Freedom of Information Act Request to the U.S. Department of Interior, and are
on file with author.

Purpose

Party

Amount
(max acrefeet)

FIGURE 1: Jicarilla Apache Nation water rights leases to off-reservation users: 1992–2013.152
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Purpose
Industrial use,
oil and gas
drilling

Water Supply,
municipal use

Drought
protection for
electrical
generating
station and coal
mining

Municipal
supply

Party

San Juan Basin
Waterhaulers
Association

Elks Lodge No.
1747
(Farmington,
NM)

PNM, Arizona
Public Service
Company, BHP
Navajo Coal
Company

City of Gallup,
NM
“Fair
Market
Value”
(FMV)

$110
per AF

$30,000 per
year holding
fee until
delivery begins

$220,000
increased by
10% per year
(nonreimbursable
reserve fee,
credited toward
supply)

n/a

n/a

Other
Payments

Nov. 22,
2011

Mar. 2,
2007

Jan. 1,
2006

Jan. 1,
2006

Date of
Contract

[TBD]

Jan. 1,
2007

Jan. 1,
2006

Jan. 1,
2006

40 years
after 1st
delivery

Dec. 31,
2016

Dec. 31,
2015

Dec. 31,
2015

End
Date

No.

Yes. Tribe or
buyer may
reduce or
terminate
early at its
discretion.

No.

No, but
“penalty” of 1
year costs
results if
buyer
terminates
early.

Early
Termination

New
calculation
of FMV
every 2
years.

Yes. 10%
increase
each year.

Yes. 8%
increase
each year.

Yes. 10%
increase
each year.

Water
Price
Escalator
Clause

unknown

7,500

8,500

$90
per AF

$100
per AF

Price

Date of
First
Delivery

202

15

200

Amount
(max acrefeet)
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In-stream flow
to protect
endangered
silvery minnow
Water supply
for luxury
residential
development,
Santa Fe, NM
Water supply
(ski area)

U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation

Club at Las
Campanas

Sipapu
Recreational
Development

100

600

5,300

$82
per AF

$82
per AF

$81
per AF

Price

n/a

$39.32 per AF
in “project fees”

$42,930 (nonrefundable
advance
payment)

Other
Payments

Feb. 15,
2013

Feb. 8,
2013

2012

Date of
Contract

Jan. 1,
2013

Jan. 1,
2013

“Released
as
necessary”

Date of
First
Delivery
Early
Termination

Dec. 31,
2013

Dec. 31,
2022

No.

Yes. Buyer can
terminate
early for any
reason; Tribe
may not.

Sept. 30, No.
2013

End
Date

No.

Yes.
Indexed
to CPI or
2%,
whichever
is higher.

No.

Water
Price
Escalator
Clause

Fall 2014

*Pass-through charge for operation & maintenance (O&M) of federal infrastructure

Purpose

Party

Amount
(max acrefeet)
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